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21 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and objectives
Existence and effective operation of non-governmental organizations is seen as one of the 
foundations of a genuine democracy and strong civil society. The principal legal platform 
for their existence is laid down by the right to freedom of association guaranteed by 
international human rights law. Freedom of association forms a fundamental framework for 
exercise of other rights and enables individuals to unite their efforts and pursue common 
purposes in their society. Societies move forward when their members are empowered to 
mobilize behind common interest and take joint action. Even in the most challenging 
environments, civil society can empower citizens and contribute to strengthening 
democracy. While there is no single recipe for improving the human rights situation 
worldwide, a common ingredient in bringing about positive change is the strong role of 
civil society1.
Freedom of association is universally recognized as an essential component of democracy 
enhancing further human rights development. It guarantees the right to form and join 
associations, political parties and trade unions and recognizes the importance of citizens to
influence their governments and contribute to social, economic and political development. 
The importance and relevance of the right to freedom of association was demonstrated by 
the consensus decision of 30 September this year by the UN Human Rights Council to 
establish the first-ever UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of assembly and association2, to 
provide a special attention to these fundamental freedoms currently lack.
Freedom of association, however, is not an absolute right. It is subject to restrictions 
provided by international human rights standards, intended to ensure balance between the 
individual and the community, or between competing rights. Governments may take steps 
                                                
1 The speech of the US delegation at the UN Human Rights Council on 30 September 2010.
2 UN Human Rights Council Resolution, A/HRC/15/L.23 of 27 September 2010. 
3to ensure that the aims and activities of organisations do not, for example, genuinely 
threaten public safety or national security, and may ensure that members of NGOs do not 
promote hate speech or racism, or use NGOs for personal financial gain.
In many countries a large gap exists between the protections provided by law and the daily 
experience of organizations claiming their right to freedom of association. As binding 
international human rights instruments are quite general and vague and the case law is 
rather sparse, governments are entitled with a broad discretion of interpretation of the right 
to freedom of association and its restrictions. In many cases governments claim the 
restrictions as legitimate but may use it as a tool to suppress human rights organizations, as 
they are often perceived to pose a threat if they are critical of state policy. 
This paper identifies a growing trend of the adoption of restrictive laws regulating 
establishment and operation of NGOs in Azerbaijan, Belarus and the Russian Federation. 
Broad and vague provisions often provide the authorities with a possibility to misapply and 
arbitrarily abuse the laws, often resulting in severe consequences on the right to freedom of 
association. The Governments try to hamper the ability of individuals to exercise their right 
to form NGOs, by imposing cumbersome and partial registration procedures, often 
resulting in refusal of its registration, by establishing a wide discretionary right to control 
NGOs activities or by imposing financial constraints.
This paper seeks to analyze the permissibility of restrictions on freedom of association 
provided by international human rights standards and the legality of means taken by 
governments to restrict the work of human rights NGOs. The limits of discretion of 
national authorities to interpret the restrictions must be defined in order to avoid their 
arbitrary application and to ensure effective exercise of the right to freedom of association.
While freedom of association remains an underdeveloped right in international human 
rights law, human rights NGOs are facing increasingly sophisticated attempts by 
governments to restrict their activities through a variety of means. This paper suggests the 
4ways in which the right to freedom of association could be developed to provide better 
protection to human rights NGOs. 
1.2 Structure of analysis
The analysis consists of three parts where both international regulation of freedom of
association and its national implementation are taken into consideration, followed by 
conclusions addressing key findings and implications of restrictive exercise of the right.
The first part introduces background information, main objective of the analysis and its 
relevance. It describes main key issues to be addressed in the analysis and lists main 
sources that were used for comprehensive research.
The second part of analysis provides legal interpretation of permissible restrictions applied 
to freedom of association, based on provisions of international and regional legally binding 
instruments. As binding documents are not specific enough on the content of freedom of 
association and restrictions, case law and soft law instruments play a significant role in 
their interpretation. The analysis primarily focuses on the legal framework of the UN and 
the CoE. The ICCPR and the ECHR are the guiding treaties in this analysis, due to the 
focus of analysis on the situations with regard to respect for freedom of association in 
countries which have signed the mentioned treaties.3 The ECtHR case law, as well as 
reports and documents of international human rights monitoring mechanisms, such as the 
UN HRC and the mandates of the UN Special Rapporteurs, are of fundamental value in 
analyzing content and restrictions on freedom of association.
The third part of the analysis discusses the establishment of the right to freedom of 
association in national law and its application in practise. It identifies the challenges and 
restrictions that human rights defenders face with regard to enjoyment of this right and 
argue their legality based on international legal requirements interpreted in first part of 
                                                
3 With Belarus as an exception which is the only European country that has not signed the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
5analysis. It particularly analyses the situation in Azerbaijan, Belarus and the Russian 
Federation - countries which have been recently considered as particularly restrictive with 
regard to the operation of human rights organizations and their activities. This analysis 
identifies the main prevailing trends related to the freedom of association in those countries 
and argues their legality on the basis of international human rights standards. 
Conclusions include the major findings on the legal means used to restrict the exercise of 
the right to freedom of association and will emphasize their (il)legality from the perspective 
of international human rights standards. It will discuss the implications of restrictive NGO 
law and its arbitrary application on human rights situation and development of civil society 
and democracy in authoritarian countries. 
1.3 Methodology and sources
The analysis is a multidisciplinary research, carried out mainly from legal and socio-
political perspectives. It is based both on primary and secondary sources. It primarily 
focuses on binding international and regional human rights treaties, as well as national laws 
regulating operation of NGOs in the countries. The ECtHR case law on freedom of 
association and both the UN and the CoE soft law, like resolutions, reports and 
recommendations are used as a primary source in analyzing international standards of the 
content of freedom of association. Scholarly literature and articles are used as a very useful 
source to recognize the complexity of freedom of association with regard to its national 
implementation. Reports of both national and international NGOs were used as a unique 
and essential source of analysing arbitrary application of national NGOs laws and arguing 
its legality. Two field trips resulted in collection of valuable information that enabled me to 
make a personal analysis of how restrictions are applied. A trip to the South Caucasus 
region provided with the possibility to take part in the regional meeting of the South 
Caucasus Network on Human Rights Defenders and meet numerous local NGOs4. During 
my other trip to Belarusian Human Rights House in exile in Vilnius, Lithuania where 
Human Rights House Network’s annual meeting was held I met the representatives of 
                                                
4 www.caucasusnetwork.org
6NGOs from 15 countries, including Belarus and the Russian Federation5. As a result of 
interviews with members of the local NGOs during both trips, I received beneficial first-
hand information on restrictions on freedom of association applied by governments and on 
its effect to their operation and human rights activities. It greatly contributed to identifying 
clear violations of the right to freedom of association.
                                                
5 www.humanrightshouse.org
72 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
2.1 Legal framework of freedom of association
International human rights law establishes the right of individuals to form human rights 
organizations and engage in activities to protect human rights. The possibility of human 
rights NGOs to be established and to operate is ensured by extensive international 
guarantees of freedom of association. Freedom of association, which is the essential right 
for human rights NGOs to function, was first established in the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights6. Despite its non-binding effect, it was adopted by the UN 
member states and established the universal language of human rights, based on the 
principle that human rights are the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world”.7 In 1966 freedom of association was given a binding legal weight in the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 8. It is the first human rights treaty that 
codified the right to freedom of association on international level and now includes the 
great majority of states in the world. Article 22 (1) of ICCPR provides:
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others”.
Specific state commitments to protect human rights defenders, including human rights 
NGOs, are reaffirmed in the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of 
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms9 and in a number of UN General Assembly and 
Human Rights Council resolutionsThe UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders was
adopted by the UN General Assembly by consensus in 1998 and is the first UN instrument 
to acknowledge the importance of the work done by human rights defenders. Article 5 of 
the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states:
“For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, at the 
national and international levels:
                                                
6 Art. 20 of the UDHR: “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association”.
7
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).
8.UN. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
9 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/53/144.
8(b) To form, join and participate in non-governmental organizations, associations 
or groups.”
Regional human rights organizations have adopted legal instruments to protect human 
rights defenders at a regional level, establishing the freedom of association as one of the 
fundamental rights to be respected10. In terms of regional organizations, the analysis will 
only focus on the protection guaranteed by instruments of CoE, namely the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Its Article 11 guarantees the
right to freedom of association to all the individuals within the jurisdiction of CoE member 
states. Moreover, its respect is ensured by the ECtHR that supervises the fulfillment of the 
obligations by the member states. 
The mentioned human rights instruments form the fundamental basis for universal and 
regional promotion and protection of the right to freedom of association which contributes 
to the enhancement of democracy and civil society. However, the right to freedom of 
association is effective only if national legislation encompasses international human rights 
standards and facilitates its exercise. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the 
commitments placed in international and regional human rights instruments are effectively 
and universally respected at a national level. 
2.2 Scope and content of freedom of association
Freedom of association is generally defined as the right to associate with others to pursue a 
common interest.11 Jeremy McBride argues that respect for the freedom of association is
both to establish a “genuine democracy” and to ensure that, once achieved, it remains 
“healthy and flourishing”. He argues that the formation of non-governmental organizations, 
which he equates with civil society, is the “fruit of associational activity”12.
                                                
10 Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights of  4 November 1950, Article 16 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights of 22 November 1969, Article 10 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights of 21 October 1986.
11 Joseph Sarah (2000), para.19.11, p.432.
12 McBride Jeremy (2005), p.1.
9Neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR provide a detailed list of possible purposes that NGOs 
could pursue. Its scope is assumed to be very broad, provided that its purpose is legal and 
lawful. Religious societies, political parties, commercial undertakings and trade unions are 
as protected by Article 22 of the ICCPR as are cultural or human rights NGOs, soccer clubs 
or associations of stamp collectors.13 The right to form an NGO, deriving from the right to 
freedom of association, recognizes that individuals are entitled to unite together to pursue a 
common purpose.14 At its core lies a simple proposition: the attainment of individual goals, 
through the exercise of individual rights, is generally impossible without the aid and 
cooperation of others. This premise underpins NGO action to defend human rights.15 The 
former European Commission of Human Rights defined freedom of association in its case 
law as “a general capacity for the citizens to join without undue interference by the State in 
associations in order to attain various ends".16 The ECtHR elaborated on this issue and 
affirmed that Article 11 of the ECHR “does not seek to protect a mere gathering of people 
desirous of “sharing each others company”; it follows that, in order for it to be an 
association, some kind of institutional structure is required, even if it is only an informal 
one.”17
The right to freedom of association encompasses not only the right to form a new 
organization or to join an existing one, but also ensures a right for it to effectively function 
and operate. Otherwise, the right to freedom of association would lose its substance, that is, 
to reach the goals and conduct its activities. This was concluded by the ECtHR when it 
stated that “the right guaranteed by Article 11 would be largely theoretical and illusory if it 
were limited to the founding of an association, since the national authorities could 
immediately disband the association […]. It follows that the protection afforded by Article 
11 lasts for an association’s entire life […]”.18 Therefore, the issues of operation and 
dissolution of organization are also covered by Article 11 of the ECHR and it can only be 
                                                
13 Nowak Manfred, (2005), p. 497.
14Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, para. 40.
15 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Report on Human Rights Organizations, para.47.
16 X v. Sweden, para.52.
17 CoE Thematic Report on Freedom of Association, para.1.b.5.
18 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, para. 33.
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dissolved by state authorities if the conditions for restrictions provided by the international 
human rights standards are met.19
The right to freedom of association is inalienable and applies to all, regardless of 
associations being in favour of or critical towards the governments’ activities. As stated by 
the UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, the protection of freedom of 
association includes human rights NGOs whose work may offend the Government, 
including organizations that criticize policies, publicize human rights violations perpetrated 
by authorities, or question the existing legal and constitutional framework.20 However, 
many authoritarian governments that are subject to criticism by human rights NGOs tend to 
use both legal and illegal instruments to suppress and restrict their activities. 
2.3 Legal restrictions of freedom of association 
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides that State Parties hold obligation to respect and to ensure 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
ICCPR, including the right to freedom of association21. This obligation is twofold. First, 
states have a positive obligation to ensure the respect of the right to freedom of association, 
which means that states must take appropriate measures in order to ensure the full 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of association to all individuals in their territory. They 
also have a negative obligation to refrain from arbitrary interference with the right. It can 
be restricted based on the need to balance between a right of individual and public interests 
or the right of other individuals. However, it cannot be restricted under the conditions other 
than the ones provided by the ICCPR. 
Article 22 (2) of the ICCPR provides a list of permissible restrictions upon the freedom of 
association that are to be: 
“...prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
                                                
19 Viktor Korneenko v. Belarus
20 Report of UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, para.49.
21 Identical obligation is established in Article 1 of the Convention.
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health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.“22
Limitation clauses found in international human right law relating to freedom of 
association are, on the face of it, quite broad, and permit rather extensive limitations. The 
ECtHR, however, interpreted restrictions on freedom of association cautiously and 
narrowed the scope of governments to invoke restriction clauses: only convincing and 
compelling reasons can justify restrictions on freedom of association”23. The ECtHR 
affirmed that states have the right to satisfy themselves that an association's aim and 
activities are in conformity with national legislation, and therefore interfere with the right 
to freedom of association, however, they must do so in a manner compatible with their 
obligations under the ECHR24. In order for a state to justify its interference with the right to 
freedom of association, all these requirements must be met cumulatively and applied in a
least restrictive manner. 
2.3.1 Prescribed by law 
The requirement of legality of restrictions of freedom of association means the existence of 
a certain legal basis in national legislation allowing states to deviate from international 
human rights standards, in other words, it has to be prescribed by law. Neither the ICCPR, 
nor the ECHR do not provide, which national legal acts are to establish such restrictions. 
As provided in the Siracusa principles, it must be national law of general application, 
which is consistent with the ICCPR and is in force upon application.25 The term “law” is to 
be intended as a general-abstract parliamentary act or an equivalent unwritten norm of 
common law.26 The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders discussed this issue in 
her report on freedom of association where she admitted that “it would seem reasonable to 
presume that an interference is only "prescribed by law” if it derives from any duly 
promulgated law, regulation, decree, order, or decision of an adjudicative body. By 
contrast, acts by governmental officials that are ultra vires would seem not to be 
                                                
22 The restrictions provided by the ECHR are almost identical to Art 22(2) of the ICCPR, therefore the 
analysis of the restrictions will include ECHR case law on this issue.
23 Ibid.13, para.40. See also Gorzelik and Others v. Poland.
24 Ibid.13, para.40.




“prescribed by law”, at least if they are invalid as a result.”27 Therefore, the governments 
cannot apply restrictions using administrative regulations, for example. However, in most 
cases application of restrictions on freedom of association will be caused by a court or 
other national authority applying this law, but not by the law itself. Even if the relevant 
national law is misapplied, the ECtHR that does not have a right to interpret domestic law 
will nevertheless conclude that such interference was “prescribed by law”28. In such a 
situation the Siracusa Principles provides a guarantee of adequate safeguards and effective 
remedies to be provided to the individuals concerned.29
Another aspect of the requirement “prescribed by law” is the quality of the national law 
providing for restrictions on the freedom of association. As the ECtHR stated in its case 
law, it also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of 
law, a concept inherent in all the articles of the ECHR. Quality in this sense implies that 
[…] it must be sufficiently accessible and precise, in order to avoid all risk of 
arbitrariness.”30 It requires a certain level of foreseeability, which depends on the content of 
the instrument in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of 
those to whom it is addressed.31 Therefore, it must be published and easily accessible to all 
individuals concerned and cannot be vague or too general for them to be able to foresee 
what consequences can derive from their certain actions.  
Therefore, national legislation regulating exercise of the right to freedom of association 
must clearly indicate the scope of state discretion that must be in compliance with 
international human rights standards. 
2.3.2 Necessary in a democratic society
Another requirement for legitimate restrictions on freedom of association calls for a 
balance between the right of individual and society interests. A state obligation to prove 
                                                
27 Report of Special Rapporteur on Human Rights (2009), para. 27.
28 Zvonimir Mataga, (2006), p. 17.
29 Ibid. 24, para. 18.
30 Amuur v. France, para. 50.
31 N.F. v Italy, para 26-28.
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this link is established in the Siracusa Principles where it is stated that “the burden is upon 
the state […] to demonstrate that limitations do not impair the democratic functioning of 
the society.”32 A state itself makes the initial assessment of what is “necessary in a 
democratic society” in each case. The ECtHR has elaborated on this issue in its case law 
stating that “necessary” in this context does not mean “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”. 
It implies the existence of a “pressing social need” for restrictions to be applied in this 
situation. There must be particularly serious reasons for interferences by public authorities 
to be legitimate for these purposes.33 For example, a promotion of Sharia law as the 
ordinary law, which is a regime “clearly diverging from Convention values, particularly 
with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of 
women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with 
religious precepts” cannot be justified as necessary in a democratic society34. 
Moreover, the requirement of necessity encompasses an element of proportionality. It calls 
for a balance between the intensity of restrictions on freedom of association and specific 
grounds for state interference. Objective justification for limiting the right is not sufficient. 
The State must “demonstrate that […] it is in fact necessary to avert a real, and not only 
hypothetical danger […] and that less intrusive measures would be insufficient to achieve 
this purpose”35. The scope of the restriction “imposed […] must be proportional to the 
value, which the restriction serves to protect. It must not exceed that needed to protect that 
value”.36
As there is no single definition of what democratic society is, the Siracusa Principles 
suggest to hold society “which recognizes and respects the human rights set forth in the 
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”37 as a guiding 
reference in that respect. The reference to a democratic society means that proportionality 
                                                
32 Ibid. 24, para 20.
33 See, for example, Handyside v. United Kingdom; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.
34 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, para. 72.
35 Lee vs The Republic of Korea,paras 7.2.-7.3.
36
Faurisson v France, separate opinion of its members E. Evatt, Mrs. D. Kretzmer and E. Klein, para.8
37 Ibid.24, para.21.
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and necessity must be considered in light of “pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness and 
people’s sovereignty” 38 which are the basic democratic values. 
2.3.3 Legitimate aims of restrictions
For a state interference with the right to freedom of association to be lawful, it must pursue 
a legitimate aim upon application of restrictions. As provided in Article 22(2) of the 
ICCPR, freedom of association can only be restricted:
 in the interests of national security or public safety,
 in the interests of public order (ordre public), 
 in the interests of protection of public health or morals,
 in the interests of protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
It is sufficient to pursue one of the above mentioned aims for a measure to restrict the right 
to freedom of association to be lawful. It is important to interpret them as narrowly as 
possible in order to avoid abuse of them by states applying the restrictive measures. The 
state restricting the right to freedom of association has an obligation to justify its 
compliance with one of the grounds listed above. 
The Siracusa Principles provide a guiding definition for each legitimate aim serving as 
justification to restrict the right to freedom of association. Protection of national security
should be characterized as protection of “the existence of the nation or its territorial 
integrity or political independence against force or threat of force.” It does not apply to 
“merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order.”39 In contrast to public order, 
national security is endangered only in grave cases of political or military threat to the 
entire nation. 40 Moreover, the Johannesburg Principles elaborates on legitimate national 
security interest, stating that it does not include the interest “to protect a government from 
embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning
of its public institutions, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial 
                                                
38 Ibid.12, p.505
39 Ibid. 24, para.29-30. 
40 Ibid.12, p.506.
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unrest.”41 For example, the state cannot invoke protection of national security and 
territorial integrity to refuse registration of organization that promotes traditions and culture 
of national minority.42
Public order is defined as “a sum of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the 
set of fundamental principles on which society is founded”43, including respect for human 
rights. As the ECtHR has stated in its case law, democracy is without doubt a fundamental 
feature of the European public order.44 The ECHR establishes a very clear connection with
democracy by stating that “the maintenance and further realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy 
and on the other by a common understanding and observance of human rights”45.
Public safety as a legitimate aim intends to protect safety of persons, their life, physical 
integrity, or their property from a serious damage. Moreover, the Siracusa Principles 
provide a safety clause that restriction for public safety can only be invoked if adequate 
safeguards and effective remedies against abuse are ensured.46
Public health can be invoked as a legitimate aim to restrict a right to freedom of 
association if there is a need to take such measures to ensure prevention and protection of 
the population or its individuals from a serious threat to their health. For example, 
promotion of use of cannabis when such a use is considered a crime in a state leads to 
promotion of a breach of law resulting in detrimental consequences for public health, 
therefore, can be considered as inadmissible objective of organization and therefore 
restricted.47
                                                
41 The Johannesburg Principles, para.2. 
42 Ibid. 13, para. 37.
43 Ibid. 24, para. 22. 
44 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey, para.45.
45 Klass and others v Federal Republic of Germany, para.59.
46 Ibid.24, para. 33-34.
47 Larmela v. Finland, para. 54.
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A state enjoys a certain margin of discretion when referring to public morals as a legal 
ground for restricting a right to freedom of association. However, the Siracusa Principles 
take into account its dynamic dimension when applied as public morality can be qualified 
in a different way in different countries or cultures. Therefore, fundamental values of 
community must be respected.48
Rights and freedoms of others as a legitimate aim to restrict a right to freedom of 
association is one of the most sensitive grounds in terms of its abuse by states. The Siracusa 
Principles provide that this term includes not only rights and freedoms recognized by the 
ICCPR but also extends beyond it.49 In case of conflict of two rights or freedoms which are 
recognized by different mechanisms, priority should be given to rights that are not subject 
to limitations. The Siracusa Principles expressly affirm the right of human rights defenders, 
including human rights NGOs, to criticize the government and express their own opinion, 
providing that restriction of a certain right will not be based on saving reputation of the 
state or its officials from public criticism.50
The ECtHR has on numerous occasions affirmed that the ECHR is a “living instrument”51, 
which means that it applies to situations when a balance between public and private 
interests is challenged, that is, in case of application of restrictions on human rights, 
including the right to freedom of association. It is dependent on specific situation and 
circumstances of the case. However, restriction of a right must not be implemented in a 
contradiction to the other right or interest, it is rather a reconciliation of both rights. 
Therefore, permissible restrictions must be always justified and least restrictive in order not 
to deprive the right of its essence.
                                                
48 Ibid. 24, para. 27.
49 Ibid. 24, para.35.
50 Ibid. 24, para. 37.
51 See, for example, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, para. 31.
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2.4 Derogation from the right to freedom of association 
The ICCPR provides for a possibility of states to derogate from certain rights under certain 
circumstances. Article 4 of the ICCPR states:
“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation […] the States Parties 
[…] may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law […].“52
For a state to have a right to derogate from its human rights obligations, it needs to meet 
certain requirements. First, the right needs to be qualified as derogable under international 
human rights standards. Second, there needs to be a “public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation” situation and the measure taken must be” strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation”. Siracusa Principles provide for a clarification of what is a 
threat to life of nation: it includes a threat to physical integrity of population, political 
independence or territorial integrity of states, or basic functioning of institutions ensuring 
human rights.53 It also states that emergency does not need to effect the whole population 
or the whole territory of the state, it can be a certain group of people or a certain territory 
where the threat occurs.54 A situation of armed conflict on the territory of a state would 
most likely amount to such an emergency, as would other situations that might threaten the 
life or security of the nation.55 Third, the measure taken must be strictly necessary and 
proportionate, and based on exigencies of the situation in the state, taking into account the 
“severity, duration and geographical scope”56 of the measure. Moreover, it must be based 
on examination of actual situation and on the imminent, not potential, danger to nation. 
Fourth, in case of derogation, a state needs not violate its other international obligations, 
both provided by international treaties and customary law. Finally, the state, availing itself 
of derogation, has an obligation to make an official proclamation of existence of the 
situation in the country and the measures applied.57
                                                
52 The same terminology is enshrined in Article 15 of the Convention.
53 Ibid. 24, para. 39.
54 Also Ireland v. United Kingdom, para.205.
55 Duffy Helen,  (2007), p. 293.
56 Ibid. 24, para.51.
57 Ibid. 24, paras. 42, 44.
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Both the ICCPR and the ECHR list the rights that are non-derogable in any circumstances. 
The right to freedom of association is derogable, provided that the state meets the 
conditions set out by international human rights standards, including the requirement of 
necessity and proportionality.58 In the last decade the right to freedom of association is one 
of the rights that are often called into question in the presence of a perceived terrorist 
threat, by proscribing certain organizations of activities.59 Several UN Special Rapporteurs 
have expressed concern with regard to situation of human rights defenders, including 
human rights NGOs, when combating terrorism in emergency situations. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders stated that in many current and recent emergencies 
human rights defenders are often prevented from conducting their human rights work. In 
addition, where defenders have tried to fulfil their role they have themselves been 
vigorously targeted in what amounts to an actual policy of silencing them. Legitimate 
limits may be placed on the exercise of rights in a state of emergency, thus abusing respect 
for human rights.60 As a response to deteriorating situation, in his report on the impact of 
the war on terror to freedom of association and peaceful assembly The UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
while Countering Terrorism has stated that states should not resort to derogation measures 
with respect to the rights to freedom of assembly and association and that the measures 
limiting these rights provided for in the ICCPR are sufficient to fight terrorism effectively.
61 As the European Commission of Human Rights has stated in its so called Greek case62, 
the crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, 
permitted by the ECHR for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly 
inadequate. In both cases states must comply with international human rights standards 
when taking measures to counter terrorism and when those measures limit or derogate from 
                                                
58 In its General Comment No.29, UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern over insufficient 
attention being paid by states to the principle of proportionality, when derogating from human rights 
obligations, para.4.
59 Ibid.55, p.322.
60 Report of UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (2003), para. 49.
61 The UN General Assembly resolution A/61/267, para.13.
62The Greek case (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands v. Greece), para. 153.
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the rights ensured in the ICCPR or the ECHR, necessity and proportionality requirements 
must be met.63
                                                
63 Recently it was again reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/64/163, para.6.
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3 FROM INTERNATIONAL TO NATIONAL LEVEL: PREVAILING TRENDS IN 
AZERBAIJAN, BELARUS AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
In many countries a large gap exists between the protection of freedom of association 
provided by law and the daily experience of human rights NGOs that are subject to 
government repression. As governments are often subject to criticism of NGOs, they may 
see them as a threat to their legitimacy and therefore seek to impede their activities despite 
their international human rights obligations. Human rights NGOs are often perceived to 
pose threat if they comment on the most politicized areas like democracy, respect for 
human rights or impunity of state officials for their committed violations. Very often 
governments claim that the restrictions that they place on the right to freedom of 
association are legitimate but in reality this study shows that they tend arbitrarily interpret 
them and extend their application field and therefore use it as a tool to repress such 
organizations. Governments may use legal procedures to disrupt the work of human rights 
NGOs in the alleged need to protect the public from human rights NGOs activities. In most 
cases they tend to imply burdensome procedures of NGOs registration which is often a 
precondition of full enjoyment of the right to freedom of association upon acquisition of 
legal entity status; and once they are established, the governments apply strict policy of 
supervisory control over NGOs activities and the use of their funds, sometimes leading to 
accusation of being engaged in extremism activities, which often results in serious 
consequences like deprivation of the right to freedom of association.
3.1 Restrictions on formation and registration of human rights organizations
3.1.1 Importance of establishment of legal personality of NGOs
Establishment of legal personality for NGOs is of significant importance as it provides 
them with the possibility to fully exercise the right to freedom of association. In most cases 
it is a precondition for a right to open a bank account, to receive grants from donors, to 
engage in court proceedings or to rent premises. 
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In states practice there are two models applied to NGOs to acquire legal personality. Most 
democratic countries set up a requirement for NGOs to send a notification on the 
establishment of a certain organization, which is sufficient for it to acquire legal 
personality. In other countries, however, national NGO laws often provide for a 
compulsory registration of NGOs in state registry as a basic condition for them to acquire 
legal personality and to be able to conduct their activities. 
There is no mutual consensus on the issue of compulsory registration on international 
arena. Neither the ICCPR, nor the ECHR do not include any explicit provision on this 
issue. However, Fundamental Principles on NGOs provide that NGOs can be either 
informal bodies or organizations, which have legal personality.64 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders have recently stated that “registration should not 
be compulsory and that NGOs should be allowed to exist and carry out collective activities 
without having to register if they so wish”65. Therefore, it comes out that it is for NGOs 
themselves to decide upon their intention to acquire legal personality, and national law 
should provide them with this possibility. However, some scholars admit that a requirement 
to register organizations and acquire legal personality is permissible under Article 22 (2) of 
the ICCPR. The need to protect public order would allow authorities to use compulsory 
registration as a mean to control legality of organizations. The protective purpose of a state 
can justify compulsory registration system in order to make it possible for authorities to 
control lawfulness of formation of associations by requiring submission of articles of 
associations evidencing its purpose, place of business, organs and financing.66 However, 
very often it does not negatively affect NGOs as they themselves seek for legal personality 
in order to acquire certain rights that are of crucial importance to the implementation of 
their activities. 
Laws enabling NGOs to acquire legal personality play a significant role in exercising the
right to freedom of association, ensured by international human rights instruments. The 
                                                
64 CoE Fundamental Principles on NGOs, para.5.
65 Report of UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders (2009), 
66 Ibid. 12, p.506
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Fundamental Principles on NGOs provide that when a legal personality is not automatically 
acquired through the establishment of NGO, the procedure must be as simple and 
undemanding as possible and must not entail the exercise of discretion.67 The ECtHR has 
recognized a right to form a legal entity in order “to act collectively in a field of mutual 
interest, which is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of 
association”68.  Therefore, arbitrary application or burdensome requirements with regard to 
NGO registration may amount to violation of the right to freedom of association ensured by 
international human rights standards. 
In terms of practical efficiency of acquisition of legal personality is rather controversial in 
countries applying restrictive policy on establishment of NGOs. The requirement of 
compulsory registration as a precondition for the NGOs to operate often leads to opening 
the states a possibility to overly control and interfere in NGO activities and therefore 
impede the right to freedom of association. On the other hand, informal non-registered 
NGOs which may avoid direct burdensome state control, are actually deprived of their 
effective operation as it is conditional on rights granted upon its registration. 
3.1.2 NGO registration in Azerbaijan  
Azerbaijan holds international obligation to respect and promote the right to freedom of 
association as it is a state party both to the ICCPR and the ECHR69 and therefore bound by 
their provisions. On a national level, the right is established in the Constitution of 
Azerbaijan and unrestricted activity of all associations is ensured.70 The Law on Non-
Governmental Organizations (Public associations and Foundations) (hereinafter -
Azerbaijani NGO Law) regulates establishment and operation of non-governmental 
organizations in Azerbaijan and the Law on State Registration and State Register of Legal 
Entities (hereinafter – Azerbaijani State Register Law) lays down procedural registration 
rules. The whole national legal framework seems to correspond to international freedom of 
                                                
67 Ibid. 64, Explanatory memorandum, para. 42
68
Ibid. 13, para. 40
69 The ICCPR was ratified by Azerbaijan on November 13, 1992; the Convention - April 15, 2002.
70 Article 58 (2) of the Constitution of Azerbaijan. 
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association standards, however, some provisions may result in violation of the right, 
especially having in mind that its effectiveness significantly depends on the implementation 
by Azerbaijani state authorities. 
Azerbaijani national legislation does not explicitly provide for a compulsory registration 
requirement for NGOs, however, it states that “a non-governmental organization shall 
receive the legal entity status only after passing state registration.”71 As a result, even 
though theoretically informal organizations could exist, organizations without legal entity 
status are deprived of rights that are essential to formation and operation of NGOs, like a 
right to receive a grant.72 Therefore, all NGOs willing to effectively operate in Azerbaijan 
are subject to state registration exercised by the Ministry of Justice. Despite the right to 
register organization, provided by the national law on NGOs, organizations critical to 
government are often subject to abusive application of the regulation resulting in delays of 
their registration. 
In its case Ramazanova and others v. Azerbaijan73 the ECtHR has found that a significant 
delay in registration or refusal to register organization amounted to a violation of Article 11 
of the ECHR74. The applicant was refused to register her founded public association named 
“Assistance to the Human Rights Protection of the Homeless and Vulnerable Residents of 
Baku” for five times due to each time newly-found deficiencies in documents required for 
the registration. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice did not respond to applicant’s requests 
within the time limits proscribed by relevant law and almost 4 years passed after the first 
submission of application until the organization was finally registered under the ruling of 
the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan. The ECtHR has found that “repeated failures by the 
Ministry of Justice to issue a definitive decision on state registration of the association 
amounted to de facto refusals to register the association” and based it on its previous 
decisions, defined without any considerations that a refusal to grant legal entity status to 
                                                
71 Article 16.2.
72 Law on Grants, Art. 3 (2).
73 Ramazanova and Others v. Azerbaijan.
74 See Nasibova v. Azerbaijan, and Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan.
24
organization amounts to such interference75. The Ministry of Justice justified its actions as 
delayed due to its heavy workload and argued that the lack of legal entity status did not 
prevent organization from conducting its activities. However, taking into account the 
importance of rights acquired upon the establishment of a legal entity in Azerbaijan, such 
as a right to open a bank account, to receive grants or to rent premises, inability to establish 
such an entity leads to deprivation of any meaning of the right to freedom of association.
State interference, however, can be justified under the terms provided in Article 11(2) of 
the ECHR, that is, if such interference is “prescribed by law” to pursue a legitimate aim 
when it is “necessary in a democratic society”. The ECtHR considering if such interference 
as delay in registration can be justified, recalled that national law must provide “a measure 
of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities” with the right to 
freedom of association.76 Therefore, it must indicate the scope of discretion provided for 
public authorities in exercising their power, which was not the case in the current situation. 
It did not provide for such delays that lasted for several months as the Article 9 of 
Azerbaijani State Register Law set a ten-day time-limit for Ministry of Justice to decide on 
the state registration of organization. Furthermore, the ECtHR has found that the law did 
not provide the applicants with sufficient legal protection against the arbitrary actions of 
the Ministry of Justice and therefore did not meet the quality of law requirement. The law 
should establish possible consequences, moreover, it should provide for an automatic 
registration of a legal entity or any other legal consequences in the event the Ministry failed 
to take any action in a timely manner. In addition, the law did not specify a limit on the 
number of times the Ministry could return documents to the founders ‘with no action taken’ 
thus “enabling it, in addition to arbitrary delays in the examination of each separate 
registration request, to arbitrarily prolong the whole registration procedure without issuing 
a final decision by continuously finding new deficiencies in the registration documents and 
returning them to the founders for rectification.”77
                                                
75 See, for example, Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, para. 53. 
76 Ibid. 73, para.62.
77 Ibid. 73, para.66. 
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Following the ECtHR decisions, amendments to Azerbaijani State Register Law prolonged 
the time-limit for registration of non-governmental organizations up to forty days providing 
that in exceptional cases, in need of further investigation, the period can be prolonged for 
additional thirty days78. It established the mechanism of automatic acquisition of legal 
entity status of organizations if Ministry of Justice does not respond to their applications 
within defined time-limits79. In addition, it included a requirement for the Ministry of 
Justice to define all shortcomings at the same time and present it to the applicant for further 
elimination80 which the Ministry abused, as provided in the ECtHR cases mentioned above. 
Therefore, the law now provides for a more clear and foreseeable consequences and in that 
way seeks to ensure a higher quality of law. 
Despite legal improvements in Azerbaijani State Register Law, extending time-limit for 
registration, the ECtHR in its latest case against Azerbaijan on the right to freedom of 
association, Aliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan, has once again came to the same conclusion 
that extensive delay to reply to a request to register association amounts to de facto refusal 
to register it.81 In this case the national court has justified significant delay of Ministry of 
Justice by stating that new law provisions on registration entered into force in the meantime 
of the process of applicant’s application for registration and therefore applies to current 
situation. The ECtHR has dealt with the issue of retrospectivity of law and concluded that 
“mere entry into force of a new act [...] absolving the Ministry of Justice from 
responsibility for breaches of procedural requirements [...] is arbitrary and incompatible 
with the interests of justice and legal certainty”82. However, despite the ECtHR ruling, the 
decision has not been yet executed and the applicant organization has not been yet 
registered. Moreover, neither recent law amendments, nor the ECtHR decisions ensured 
better protection of the right to freedom of association to certain human rights NGOs 
critical to governmental activities. Recent examples show that authorities continue to abuse 
                                                
78 Article 8 of Azerbaijani State Register Law. It is important to mention that commercial institutions are to 
be registered within 5 days, as provided in Article 7-1 of the same law.
79 Ibid., Art. 8.5.
80 Ibid., Art. 8.3.
81 Aliyev and Others v. Azerbaijan, para. 33. 
82 Ibid., para. 39.
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national provisions on NGO registration and do not respond to them in timely manner or 
provide ill-founded deficiencies which are disproportionate to the postponement of the 
registration83. For example, the Election Monitoring and Democratic Studies Center was 
refused its registration for six times in the period of 2006-2008 on the basis of such 
disproportional grounds like a failure to inform about the change of legal address or a 
failure to include original receipt of fee payment for registration84.
The latest Azerbaijani NGO Law amendments establish different regulation for foreign 
NGOs or foreigners engaged in NGOs activities in Azerbaijan. It provides that only those 
foreigners and stateless persons who permanently reside in Azerbaijan can establish 
NGOs.85 This provision is in violation of international human rights obligations to which 
Azerbaijan is committed to as such a limitation clearly contradicts the right to freedom of 
association protected both by the ICCPR and the ECHR. Both human rights treaties clearly 
state that everyone has the right to freedom of association which can only be restricted on 
the grounds provided in their respective articles. Moreover, Article 1 of the ECHR provides 
an obligation to all its signatories to secure “to everyone within their jurisdiction” the rights 
ensured by the ECHR. Prohibition of establishment of NGOs to foreigners and stateless 
persons who do not permanently reside in Azerbaijan is a clear state interference with the
right to freedom of association. Therefore, it is important to define if such a prohibition is 
necessary in a democratic society in order to serve certain aims, which is a burden of state 
to prove it. Based on the analysis of what a definition of necessity in democratic society 
encompasses86, such a limitation most likely would not satisfy the requirement of the 
existence of a “pressing social need” for such a limitation and the state would fail to 
demonstrate its necessity “to avert a real danger”87. In addition, it would be contrary to the 
main idea of existence of a democratic society which aims for respect and protection of 
human rights for everyone. As provided in the Siracusa Principles, democratic society 
refers to recognition and respect for internationally protected human rights, therefore, a 
                                                
83 Legal Education Society (2010).
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85 Article 9.4 of Azerbaijani NGO Law.
86 Chapter 2.3.2 of the analysis.
87 Ibid. para 42 and 43.
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ground for such a restriction would be clearly contradictory.88 In addition, Article 25.3 of 
the Constitution of Azerbaijan guarantees “equality of rights and liberties to everyone, 
irrespective of (...) nationality.89” As the Constitution, which promotes for equality of rights 
to everyone, possesses the highest legal power in Azerbaijan90, the Azerbaijani NGO Law 
provision granting the right to freedom of association only to those foreigners and stateless 
persons who permanently reside in Azerbaijan can be challenged as being contradictory to 
the Constitution.
The new law also includes different rules on registration of foreign NGOs in Azerbaijan. 
The newly adopted provisions Azerbaijani NGO Law provides that foreign NGOs or those 
organizations that are permanently funded by foreign governments or foreign legal or 
physical entities shall be registered on the basis of international agreements concluded 
between the organization and the state authority”91. Such a provision entails discriminatory 
treatment of foreign NGOs and violates the right to freedom of association, which is 
granted to all individuals both by the ICCPR, the ECHR and the Constitution of 
Azerbaijan. In its case Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, where the 
applicant was refused re-registration of a foreign religious organization, the ECtHR has 
ruled that there is “no reasonable and objective justification for a difference in treatment of 
[…] foreign nationals as regards their ability to exercise the right to freedom of religion 
through participation in the life of organised religious communities”92. Therefore, the right 
to freedom of association can not be restricted on the basis of the nationality of applicants 
as it greatly contributes to pluralism in a democratic society that forms a part of 
international freedom of association standards. 
Moreover, as the provision does not include any detailed indications on specification of 
such agreements and the requirements for foreign NGOs, it provides the Ministry of Justice 
as a competent authority with a broad discretion to interpret it and to define the 
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92 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, para. 82.
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requirements for agreements in a way restricting the right to freedom of association to 
respective NGOs. Effectiveness of this provision highly depends on its interpretation and 
practical implementation. Azerbaijani government has claimed that such a provision aims 
“at creating favourable conditions for their functioning, state registration, administration 
and regulation of relations with government institutions. […] This norm aims at facilitating 
broader opportunities for operation of those organisations in Azerbaijan and ensuring 
additional legal guarantees for their co-operation with government agencies, local 
authorities, media and other organisations.”93 However, such a rather vague and unclear 
regulation and its discriminate application to foreign NGOs might result in legal 
uncertainty of foreign NGOs in Azerbaijan, which might sometimes lead to refusal of 
registration. 
Current national legislation regarding NGO registration in Azerbaijan cannot be considered 
contributing to respect for the right to freedom of association and to improvement of civil 
society environment in the country as it increases administrative burden of NGOs willing to 
register, provides for discriminatory regulation with regard to certain NGOs and therefore 
restricts their rights in relation to their registration. 
3.1.3 Compulsory NGO registration and its consequences in Belarus
In Belarus, the legal climate for establishment and operation of NGOs is rather 
unfavourable.  The Constitution of Belarus ensures everyone the right to freedom of 
association94, whereas the Law on Public Associations (hereinafter - Belarusian NGO Law) 
provides for compulsory registration of non-governmental organizations and explicitly 
prohibits the activities of non-registered organizations95. Belarusian NGO Law lists the 
requirements for registration of NGOs and provides the Ministry of Justice with the right to 
suspend registration for up to one month for elimination of any deficiencies occurred. It 
also lists the grounds for refusal of registration of the applicants, which include incorrigible 
violations of requirements for registration, non-compliance of relevant documents with 
                                                
93 Report of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights (2010), para.2.
94 Article 36.
95 Belarusian Law on Public Associations, Article 7.
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legal requirements and a failure to eliminate violations subject to suspension of registration. 
Examples of recent years show that independent human rights organizations are often 
confronted with systematic refusals of registration, which are widely based on minor 
mistakes or discrepancies of the required information. Organizations that are critical to 
governmental policy are often subject to arbitrary interpretation of the laws that regulate 
registration of non-governmental organizations. Several cases of constant refusals have 
been challenged in the UN Human Rights Committee, basing the complaints on legitimate 
restrictions provided in Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.96
In 2000 the human rights organization Helsinki XXI that has been established with the 
purpose to assist in implementation of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in 
Belarus was rejected its registration by the Ministry of Justice due to its declared activity to 
defend the rights of third persons. In the view of the Ministry of Justice, it was contrary to 
the provisions of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, the Belarusian 
Constitution and other relevant laws.97 The UN HRC, assessing the existence of a violation 
of the right to freedom of association of Helsinki XXI, referred to legitimate restrictions 
provided by Article 22(2) of the ICCPR. It considered that even if such restrictions as a 
prohibition to defend the rights of third persons was prescribed by national law, it is 
important for the state to prove the necessity of such restrictions in a democratic society. In 
other words, it is necessary to define why a refusal of registration would be based on 
defence of rights of third persons. Taking into account the consequences of refusal of the 
registration, i.e. the unlawfulness of activities of non-registered organization, the UN HRC 
concluded that such a decision of the Ministry of Justice does not meet the requirements 
provided in Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.98  
Another case refers to human rights NGO Nasha Viasna which was established by the 
former members of human rights NGO Viasna that was dissolved in violation of Article 
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22(2) of the ICCPR as stated by the UN HRC99. Despite its decision, Belarus has not re-
registered the organization, moreover, it did not register the new organization based on the 
fact that it is illegal in Belarus to use a name of dissolved organization. Moreover, it was 
twice refused of registration due to several minor deficiencies like incorrect indication of 
the place of work of one of the founders or incorrect name of the organization as the name 
was provided in capital letters. More importantly, the minor shortcomings were considered 
to constitute misleading information, therefore, providing the Ministry of Justice with the 
right to refuse registration. Despite the fact that Belarusian NGO Law provides for a 
possibility of one month to rectify corrigible deficiencies, which was the case of Viasna, 
during the court proceedings the Ministry of Justice itself affirmed that it has the right to 
provide an opportunity to correct shortcomings but there is no obligation to do it.100
However, even though the Ministry of Justice was legally provided with such a right to 
refuse registration of organization, based on minor deficiencies, it does not prove the 
necessity of its interference with the right to freedom of association granted to the 
applicants by the ICCPR and the Constitution of Belarus. In addition, it must be bound by 
the principle of proportionality, that is, restrictions made must be proportionate to pursued 
aims and consequences. It must provide compelling reasons proving the legitimate aim to 
be pursued based on such restriction of the applicant’s right. That being said, one must 
refer to legal consequences of refusal of registration of organization in Belarus, that is, 
illegality of activities of organization that is exercising its right to freedom of association 
guaranteed by the international human rights mechanism binding Belarus itself. 
In Belarus, individuals engaged in activities of non-registered organizations are exposed to 
criminal sanctions. Article 193.1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus provides 
for a fine or imprisonment from six months to two years for participation in such activities, 
which was introduced in 2005.  This provision must be read in conjunction with Statement 
No.49 of the Ministry of Justice of Belarus, which extends application of registration 
requirements to different types of citizens’ groups which had previously been allowed to 
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function without registration as legal persons101. It encompasses both the organizations 
which were dissolved by decisions of national courts or suspended of their activities by 
responsible registration authorities and the ones which failed to get registered by state 
authorities. Both the founders and the actual participants engaged in such activities are 
subject to criminal responsibility. In 2006-2009 17 individuals were convicted of such a 
crime in Belarus, 5 of them were sentenced to 6-18 months of imprisonment.102 For 
example, 6 members of non-registered Youth Front organization actively engaged in 
election monitoring were charged under this article and sentenced to imprisonment.103 The 
same article provides for a possibility of individuals engaged in the activities of non-
registered organizations to be exempted from criminal responsibility if they voluntarily 
cease their activities and no other criminal elements are found in their actions104. However, 
it refers to the right of discretion of the competent authorities, that is, national courts. In 
other words, they have a right but not an obligation to exempt an individual from criminal 
responsibility, which presupposes possible arbitrary application of the provision.  
Prohibition of operation of NGOs that were refused their state registration and acquisition 
of legal entity status and criminalization as a result of continuation of their activities 
deprive individuals of their right to freedom of association ensured by Article 22 of the 
ICCPR to which Belarus is a state party and holds its international human rights 
obligations. However, if such a restriction is applied in Belarus, it must then meet the 
requirements provided by the ICCPR. Even though it meets the requirement of its 
establishment by national law, it does not meet the requirement of necessity for it in a 
democratic society. Deprivation of the right to freedom of association, based on the 
registration failure, which international community considers it to be an important element 
of genuine democracy and development of civil society in states, is contrary to basic 
substance of this right. Moreover, such a restriction must meet proportionality requirement, 
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which in this case is rather disproportionate, having in mind the practical impossibility of 
registration of certain human rights NGOs in Belarus. Therefore, criminal responsibility 
imposed to individuals engaged in activities of non-registered organizations in Belarus is 
contrary to its international human rights obligations established both in the ICCPR and its 
own Constitution.
3.1.4 Regulation on NGO registration in the Russian Federation
In the Russian Federation, its Constitution105 ensures everyone the right to freedom of 
association while the Federal Law on Non-Profit Organizations (hereinafter – Russian 
NGO Law) and the Federal Law on Public Associations (hereinafter - Russian Associations 
Law) regulate the establishment and operation of NGOs in the Russian Federation, the 
latter going into more detailed regulation of public associations106. The state is also bound 
by international human rights obligations provided in the ICCPR and the ECHR.107
However, major law amendments, negatively affecting free operation of NGOs in the 
Russian Federation, were made in 2006 in order, as stated by the state authorities, to 
improve the registration process and the supervision of NGO activities, to ensure their 
transparency and protect national security in fighting terrorism and extremism108. The goal 
itself is legitimate and widely acknowledged by the international community, however, 
some provisions are rather restrictive and discriminatory, including registration of NGOs in 
the Russian Federation. 
Law amendments adopted in 2006 changed the registration procedure for NGOs operating 
in the Russian Federation. Prior to that, only public associations were subject to state 
registration in order to acquire the legal entity status, while other NGOs held obligation to 
notify the tax authorities under the same procedure as commercial entities. As of 2006, 
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article 131 of Russian NGO Law provides for a state registration of all NGOs by the 
Federal Registration Service without referring to it as to a condition to acquire legal 
personality. Therefore, it is an obligatory requirement for all NGOs willing to operate in 
the Russian Federation, followed by the unduly high registration fee, compared to the one 
applied to commercial organizations109. Moreover, the new law provides for a compulsory 
registration of changes of the constituent documents of the already-registered NGOs, such 
as charters, following the same procedure as for the registration of the NGOs themselves. 
As it was mentioned before, the purpose of the state can justify compulsory registration 
system in order to ensure the lawfulness of NGOs, but it cannot exceed the limits of the 
state authorities to interfere with the activities and management of NGOs. However, 
practice shows that based on their broadened discretion rights and legitimate requirements, 
registration authorities tend to abuse the right to freedom of association and interfere in its 
exercise, by taking into account the goals and work methods of NGOs when applying for 
registration. For example, in 2007 a Russian LGBT organization Rainbow Home was 
refused registration based on its aim to promote the rights of gays and lesbians. The 
authorities claimed that “the organisation's activity related to propaganda of non-traditional 
sexual orientation may undermine the security of the Russian society and state due to the 
following circumstances: disruption of the society's spiritual values; disruption of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation due to the decreasing number 
of its population"110 A denial of registration on such a ground is arbitrary and 
discriminatory as both the ECtHR and the UN HRC confirmed that a right to sexual 
orientation is included in the right to non-discrimination protected both by the ECHR and 
the ICCPR respectively.111 Numerous cases show the prevailing trend of authorities to 
suppress establishment of human rights organizations in an arbitrary manner.112
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The new law also lists the grounds for denial of state registration of NGOs where one of the 
grounds to refuse it is related to submission of required documents in a non-full manner or 
the documents contain unreliable information113. Such a provision empowers competent 
authorities with a broad right of discretion to interpret and apply such law. The law does 
not provide for a more detailed regulation on what information is held to be unreliable and 
does not limit state’s discretionary powers. Moreover, in determining legitimate restrictions 
of the right to freedom of association, proportionality principle must be taken into account. 
In this case, the consequences of the restrictions applied, that is, denial of state registration, 
are rather disproportional, having in mind that lack of certain information is a corrigible 
deficiency that can be rectified. Even though an NGO denied of its registration is not 
deprived of a right to re-apply, however, it would be a new procedure with another 
applicable fee for registration. Therefore, such restrictions violate the right to freedom of 
association and are contrary to guarantees enshrined in the ECHR and the ICCPR that are 
obligatory to the Russian Federation.
The Russian NGO Law encompasses special regulation with regard to registration of 
foreign NGOs, in that way excluding them under discriminatory basis from the general 
application of NGO laws. Both Russian Associations Law and Russian NGO Law provide 
that only those foreign nationals and stateless persons who legally domicile in the Russian 
Federation may become the founders and the members of NGOs.114 As it was already 
concluded above, such a limitation contradicts both the ICCPR and the ECHR as both 
provide that everyone has the right to freedom of association which can only be restricted 
on the grounds provided in their respective articles. Such a clear interference by a state 
cannot be justified as a necessity in democratic society as non-discriminatory exercise of 
the right to freedom of association in itself contributes to promotion of such society. 
Moreover, the new law extends a list of grounds for denial of registration applied to 
branches of the foreign NGOs operating in the territory of the Russian Federation, 
including such a ground which refers to goals of NGOs being contradictory to or 
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threatening such national values as sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity 
or national interests.115 Given the arbitrary interpretation of the provisions by the Russian 
authorities, it can be subject to state interference with the right to freedom of association 
exceeding limits given by the international standards.
The right to freedom of association is not necessarily violated by requirements to register 
or license the association, so long as these schemes do not impair the activities of an 
association. However, the tendency of recent years to adopt increasingly restrictive NGO 
laws in all three countries serves their interests to refuse registration of organizations that 
criticize their policy, report on human rights violations and call for fight against impunity 
of state authorities116. The practice to postpone registration of certain non-governmental 
organizations by delaying or refusing it due to identified recurrent deficiencies is prevailing  
and used most commonly as it results in absolute deprivation of the right to freedom of 
association. Refused of registration and therefore of legal personality organizations are 
deprived of all the rights that are essential to effective exercise of freedom of association. 
Despite the legal guarantees provided both by national law and international norms binding 
the states, national NGO laws leave a broad margin of discretion for registration authorities 
to arbitrarily decide on NGO registration. Moreover, in the case of Belarus, a person 
engaged in the activities of non-registered NGO and therefore exercising his or her right to 
freedom of association is subject to criminal prosecution, which undermines all 
fundamental principles of democratic society.
3.2 Supervisory control over activities of non-governmental organizations
The right to freedom of association covers not only the establishment of NGOs, but also the 
possibility for their members to achieve their objectives and pursue activities without 
undue state interference. The CoE Recommendations on NGOs provides a more detailed 
interpretation of the limits of states supervisory powers regarding exercise of the right to 
freedom of association. It provides that no external intervention in the operation of NGOs 
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is allowed unless in case of a serious breach of the legal requirements applicable to 
NGOs.117 In its case law the ECtHR considered that states may have a right to interfere –
subject to the condition of proportionality – with freedom of association in the event of 
non-compliance by an association with reasonable legal formalities applying to its 
establishment, functioning or internal organizational structure.118 However, some countries 
intolerant of claims to rights tend to exceed these limits by seeking to control and interfere 
in the activities of NGOs. Therefore, once the NGOs are formally registered under the 
national registration procedures and granted legal entity status in order to be able to fully 
operate and enjoy their rights, another principal concern is the excessive authorization of 
the state authorities to control activities of NGOs that is subject to interference with the
right to freedom of association ensured by international and regional human rights 
mechanisms. 
3.2.1 Regulation on NGO control in Azerbaijan
In Azerbaijan, NGOs may pursue their activities under two conditions: it must not be
prohibited by national law and it cannot be contradictory with their objectives.119 Since 
June 2009, when major changes to Azerbaijani NGO Law, affecting independent operation 
of NGOs, were adopted, competent state authorities are entitled with unlimited discretion 
right to monitor and pursue supervision over compliance of NGO activities with national 
legislation.120 The law does not provide for any guidance or criteria on application of such 
rights of state authorities and therefore is subject to an overly broad discretion right over 
control of NGOs activities without any established limitations which may lead to a clear 
interference with their right to freedom of association, including their internal affairs. 
Moreover, the Azerbaijani NGO Law includes a provision on responsibility of NGOs in 
case of violation of requirements related to their activities, providing for a liquidation of 
respective NGOs as the only possible sanction to respond to such violations. It follows as a 
consequence of two warnings to eliminate the violations received by state authorities 
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Ertan and Others v. Turkey, para. 54.
119 Article 22.1 of Azerbaijani NGO Law.
120 Article 29.5 of Azerbaijani NGO Law.
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within on year. The law itself providing for response to law violations committed by NGOs 
does not contradict international human rights standards. However, the law does not 
provide for precise criteria of what kind of violations are subject to the warnings which 
might be followed by a liquidation of NGOs as the only final measure, therefore, NGOs are 
not protected from arbitrary application of such provisions by the state authorities.
The ECtHR has questioned the legality of such a regulation, based on criteria set forth to 
define permissible restrictions of the right to freedom of association. In its case Tebieti 
Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan121 the applicants has challenged the legality 
of dissolution of the Azerbaijani NGO Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti, based on the violations
of the rules provided in its charter, such as absence of assembly of members every five 
years or improper way of informing its branches on their participation in its assemblies. 
The ECtHR agreed that dissolution of the NGO constituted interference with the right to 
freedom of association and followed the requirements set forth in Article 11 (2) of the 
ECHR in order to define its legality: it must be proscribed by law, pursue legitimate aims 
and be necessary in a democratic society. Despite the fact that such interference was 
prescribed by the Azerbaijani NGO Law, the ECtHR concluded that respective law did not 
meet the requirement of quality of law provided by the international human rights 
standards. It ruled that the provision providing for the dissolution of the NGOs is rather too 
general and is subject to extensive interpretation. It provides the Ministry of Justice with a 
“rather wide discretion to intervene in any matter related to an association’s existence”, 
therefore, it becomes difficult for NGOs to forsee which actions might be subject to the 
violations qualified as incompatible with the respective law provisions.122 Moreover, the 
ECtHR provided that dissolution is “the most drastic sanction possible in respect of an 
association and, as such, should be applied only in exceptional circumstances of very 
serious misconduct”123. In addition, the ECtHR assessed whether the requirement of 
necessity in a democratic society, including the respect for the principle of proportionality, 
was met, that is, whether the violations of the law can justify the sanction. Having in mind 
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that only compelling and convincing reasons can justify restrictions and state interference 
must correspond to a “pressing social need”124, the ECtHR considered that “the nature and 
severity of the sanction imposed are factors to be taken into account when assessing the 
proportionality of the interference”. As dissolution was the only applicable sanction, it 
concluded that “a mere failure to respect certain legal requirements on internal 
management of NGOs cannot be considered such serious misconduct as to warrant outright 
dissolution”125. Therefore, Article 31.4, providing for a dissolution as the only possible 
sanction available under the law without any precise criteria for types of violations that are 
subject to the application of such provisions, does not meet the requirement of quality of 
law, dos not prove to be necessary in a democratic society in a violation of the principle of 
proportionality and therefore is in contradiction with the right to freedom of association 
protected by the Article 11 of the ECHR. 
The current Azerbaijani NGO Law, providing for unrestricted supervisory control of NGOs 
by state authorities without any minimum safeguards or protection clauses for NGOs, is not 
in compliance with international human rights standards as it allows for unrestricted 
external interference in NGOs activities. As the protection of the right to freedom of 
association extends to all activities of NGOs and not only to a right to establish NGO, 
every case of state interference with the right must satisfy requirements set forth by Article 
11(2) of the ECHR. The same requirement applies to national provisions on dissolution of 
NGOs. As the Azerbaijani NGO Law does not differentiate the seriousness of misconduct 
in the event of violation of their bylaws or the national legislation, all NGOs are subject to 
undifferentiated and discriminatory application of the only established sanction which is 
supposed to be applied in exceptional circumstances only, as provided under international 
human rights standards. Therefore, such a restrictive regulation is not in compliance with 
international obligations of Azerbaijan to respect and promote the right to freedom of 
association.
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125 Ibid.121, para.82.
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3.2.2 The situation in the Russian Federation
In the Russian Federation, both the Russian Associations Law and the Russian NGO Law 
include provisions on a certain level of the supervision and control over activities of NGOs 
operating in the Russian Federation by various state authorities126. Both laws provide that 
registering body has a right to exercise control over compliance of activities of NGOs with 
their statutory goals, including summoning the documents of NGOs containing resolution 
on their activities, and participating in any events organized by NGOs. Moreover, since 
2006 when new law amendments were adopted, the Russian NGO Law establishes an 
obligation for NGOs to provide “documents containing an account of its activities, 
composition of its governing bodies, documentation accounting for the financial 
expenditures and the use of other resources including those obtained from international and 
foreign organizations, foreign nationals and stateless persons”.127 Legal establishment of 
such provisions without providing any limits or procedural protection means for NGOs 
empowers state authorities with broad discretion right to interfere in the activities of NGOs. 
It provides them with a legitimate right to request for any internal documents of NGOs, to 
attend their events without any restrictions and to assess their compliance with the statutory 
goals. Certainly, as affirmed by the ECtHR, the state has a right to ensure that NGOs 
activities comply with rules set out in national legislation under the condition that it meets 
requirements set out to justify such interference128. The CoE Recommendations on NGOs 
provide that information with regard to NGOs activities can only be requested  “where 
there has been a failure to comply with reporting requirements or where there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that serious breaches of the law”129. However, current 
powers are too broad and overly excessive and are likely incompatible with the state’s 
negative obligation to refrain from arbitrary interference with the right to freedom of 
association and with international standards providing for certain requirements to be met, 
particularly principle of proportionality, in order to justify such interference. 
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As a consequence of the above mentioned powers, new law provisions establish that the 
failure to respond to state requirements, such as provision of certain documents, may result 
in warning or in a court claim by the state authority for the liquidation of respective NGO. 
The practice shows that such a right is broadly exercised by the authorities. As of 1 January 
2009, over 2000 NGOs were excluded from the state registry.130 For example, Russian 
NGO “Sodeystvie” protecting refugee rights was liquidated due to its failure to notify 
location of its executive body and to provide its report131. It clearly provides the competent 
authorities with possibility of arbitrary application of the laws, especially having in mind 
hostility of Russian state authorities towards human rights NGOs that are critical of 
governmental policies. Such a regulation is challenging in terms of international human 
rights standards and the principle of proportionality which must be respected in terms of 
application of restrictions on the right to freedom of association as it allows for interference 
in the internal affairs of NGOs without weighty reasons. As the issue of dissolution of 
NGOs is a part of the right to freedom of association, protection granted by Article 11 of 
the ECHR extends to it as well, therefore, requirements to justify restrictions, that is, 
dissolution, must be met. As already stated in the case of Azerbaijan, dissolution as the 
only sanction for NGOs violations is not in compliance with international human rights 
standards. Having in mind the scope of state interference and the consequences of the 
failure to fulfil the obligations provided by law, it clearly contradicts the international 
freedom of association standards which provide that the principle of proportionality must 
be respected in both framing and applying sanctions for non-compliance with a particular 
requirement.132
The Russian national legislation provides for stricter regulation with regard to supervision 
of the foreign NGOs operating in the Russian Federation. Registration authorities are 
entitled with additional supervisory power to ban implementation of a certain program by 
the foreign NGOs in the territory of the Russian Federation.133 As it does not list the 
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grounds or provide any precise criteria for application of this right, the Russian state 
authorities are entitled with a rather excessive discretion right to decide upon activities of 
foreign NGOs and pursue a complete control. A right of state authorities to terminate 
operational programs of foreign NGOs is a clear interference with NGOs internal affairs 
and the overall right to freedom of association which can only be justified by meeting 
requirements set out in Article 11 of the ECHR. Under such regulation foreign NGOs will 
lose the freedom to organize their own activities, and as it will not be voluntary, it will 
form a violation of the right to freedom of association134. 
Moreover, in case of non-compliance with either banning on their programs or any other 
requirements, like the provision of any documents, foreign NGOs might be excluded from 
the state registry at sole discretion of the state registration authorities, without referring 
cases to the court135. A one time failure to provide required information is sufficient to 
initiate exclusion. As it does not provide for any criteria on how to determine NGO’s 
incompatibility with the requirements and what can constitute a violation subject to the 
application of such sanction is rather discretionary. Moreover, it challenges the respect for 
principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 11 of the ECHR and Article 22 of the 
ICCPR as part of the requirement of being "necessary in a democratic society" to be met in 
order to justify restrictions applied to a right of freedom of association. Having in mind its 
indiscriminate application, including minor administrative violations, and the following 
consequences, that is, the organization’s inability to function, such a provision is in 
violation with the principle. Moreover, as it is only applied to foreign NGOs, they are 
placed in less favourable position than the national NGOs and discriminated in terms of 
their right to associate, ensured by the ICCPR, the ECHR and the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation which all entitle everyone with the right to freedom of association.  In 
addition, foreign NGOs are discriminated in terms of a state body deciding on the 
dissolution of organization. In case of foreign NGOs, it is the registration authority that 
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orders the decision for dissolution without referring to a court while under international 
human standards termination of an NGO should be ordered only by a court.136
Both the Azerbaijani and the Russian NGO Laws significantly broaden supervisory powers 
of registration authorities to excessively control NGOs activities and apply punitive 
measures against NGOs, without providing clear criteria on when such powers should be 
exercised. The ECtHR concluded that national laws must "afford a measure of legal 
protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR. It would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a 
democratic society enshrined in the ECHR, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to 
be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate with 
sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion and the manner of its exercise”.137 Having 
in mind the practice of the state authorities of both countries to suppress organizations that 
are critical towards the governmental policy and the consequences of failure to comply 
with the requirements provided in the laws, such excessive interference of state authorities 
violates the right to freedom of association ensured both by the ICCPR and the ECHR. In 
order to comply with their international human rights obligations, states must clearly define 
the grounds for dissolution and apply the sanctions that are proportionate to legitimate aim 
to be achieved. Moreover, it must respect the principle of non-discrimination and ensure 
that foreign NGOs should be subject to the same rules that apply to national NGOs138.
3.3 Restrictions on access to funding and its utilization
As a principle, NGOs are not established with the aim of making profit, however, funding 
is an indispensable condition for NGOs to operate and pursue their activities. Neither the 
ICCPR, nor the ECHR do not expressly provide NGOs with a right to funding, neither 
deprive them of a right to engage in economic activities to serve their purposes. However, 
UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders serves as a stronger legal background for a 
right to funding as it establishes it as an individual right of human rights defenders, 
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independent of any other rights. Article 13 states that “everyone has the right, individually 
and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express 
purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms […]”. The 
Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders has expressed her support highlighting that 
access to funding to human right organizations is an “inherent element of the right to 
freedom of association”.139 The same provision includes a reference to Article 3 of the 
Declaration which provides for a state obligation to ensure domestic law regulating human 
rights, enshrined in Declaration, including access to funding by NGOs, to be in compliance 
with its international obligations. Therefore, all three parts of access to funding – solicit, 
receive and utilize – are indispensable of full exercise of the right to freedom of 
association. 
The Fundamental Principles on NGOs set out a similar but more specific standard than the 
Declaration: NGOs may receive funding from “another country, multilateral agencies or an 
institutional or individual donor”140 and can be used for pursuance of their activities.  In 
addition, NGOs “may engage in any lawful economic, business or commercial activities in 
order to support its non-profit-making activities”141. It sets out a condition of restrictive use 
of profits gained by NGOs to pursuance of their objectives and activities. 
In many countries the issue of NGO access to funding is controversial as it is a very 
efficient way to disrupt their activities and make them cease their existence. Governments 
establish legal restrictions and provide justifications, such as prevention of money-
laundering or support of terrorism, as such objectives are internationally acceptable.142
3.3.1 Access to funding in Azerbaijan
In Azerbaijan, provision, receipt and utilization of grants to NGOs is regulated by the Law 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Grants (hereinafter - the Azerbaijani Law on Grants). It 
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provides for a possibility of NGOs to receive grants from Azerbaijani state authorities, 
legal entities and individual persons, as well as international organizations, foreign 
governments, public organizations, individuals and other foreign donors. It sets out a clear 
requirement to conclude a written agreement between the donor and the recipient which 
serves as a legal ground to receive and utilize funding. In addition, Article 4 of the 
Azerbaijani Law on Grants provides for a compulsory state registration of grant agreements 
concluded by Azerbaijani legal entities and individuals as donors.
On 25 December 2009 the Azerbaijani President adopted a decree which introduced a new 
requirement for NGOs to register all grant agreements with the Ministry of Justice before 
making any transactions of granted funding. It sets out a clear prohibition on NGOs to 
utilize the funding before its registration. The new regulation is followed by amendments to 
Administrative Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which increases fines for failure to 
submit a grant agreement from 50AZN to 1000-2500AZN.143 In addition, the latest 
amendments to Azerbaijani NGO Law oblige the NGOs to submit their annual financial 
reports without detailing the range of information to be included in it. Moreover, new 
provisions provide for a responsibility of NGO in case of failure to submit reports.144
More restrictive regulation of receipt and utilization of funding complements the state’s 
discretion right to pursue overall control of NGOs activities in Azerbaijan in a much 
broader manner than provided by the Fundamental Principles on NGOs which state that 
NGOs should submit their annual reports to a "designated supervising body where any 
taxation privileges or other public support has been granted to the NGOs”145. In order to 
ensure transparency and accountability of utilization of the funding granted by the state 
authorities, such a requirement is justifiable and recognizable by international human rights 
standards. However, as in the case of Azerbaijan it applies to all grant agreements, received 
from either national or foreign donors without any specific regulatory goal established in 
the law, it provides the Ministry of Justice with a broader legal right to supervise all 
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funding received by NGOs in Azerbaijan and may serve as a tool to strengthen state control 
over NGOs. As provided by the Fundamental Principles on NGOs, reporting requirements 
must be tempered by other obligations relating to respect for privacy and confidentiality. 
Donor’s desire to remain anonymous must be observed, however, it sets out some limits for 
it, such as the need to combat black market money transfers.146 In any case, it must observe 
the principle of proportionality - one of requirements to be met in order to justify 
restrictions on the right to freedom of association. Moreover, a question of legality of 
heavily increased fine for a failure to register a grant agreement, compared to previous 
regulation, should be challenged, having in mind necessity of the restriction on freedom of 
association and its ability to justify the sanction. In addition, due to limited funding of 
Azerbaijani NGOs, application of such fines might lead to termination of many NGOs, 
which would be contrary to international state's obligation to promote respect for the right 
to freedom of association. 
The new regulation on failure to submit annual financial reports is rather unclear and may 
be subject to arbitrary application as it does not provide for precise sanctions and refers to 
application of relevant legislation of Azerbaijan. As well as in the case of supervisory 
control over NGO activities in Azerbaijan discussed above, the provision might be subject 
to abusive interpretation leading to dissolution of NGOs as a consequence of failure to 
meet requirements set out in national legislation regulating NGOs operation in Azerbaijan 
which is the only possible sanction to be applied.147 Its indiscriminate application and 
severe consequences irrespective of the violation committed by NGOs is contrary to 
principle of proportionality. 
As a right to access funding forms a fundamental part of the right to freedom of 
association, its severe restrictions in Azerbaijani law deprive NGOs of ability to pursue 
their objectives and activities and therefore of a possibility to exercise their right to 
freedom of association guaranteed both by the ICCPR, nor the ECHR which have a binding 
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effect to Azerbaijan. Therefore, overly burdensome requirements and excessive control 
over funding of NGOs in Azerbaijan may lead to restrictions of freedom of association 
exceeding limits provided by international human rights standards. The Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the CoE expressed his concern over a rather restrictive regulation of 
NGO funding in Azerbaijan for “attempts to control activities of NGOs in an unduly strict 
manner".148 Therefore, in order to meet its international obligations, Azerbaijan must 
facilitate access to and utilization of funding to NGOS which may be subject to restrictions 
in the interest of transparency when granted by state authorities and set out clear grounds 
for broader interference to justify its legitimate aims.
3.3.2 NGO funding in the Russian Federation
In the Russian Federation, recent amendments to national legislation, adopted in 2006,
provide for a rather strict regulation for funding received from foreign donors. The Russian 
Government adopted a decree which served as a legal basis for the government to establish 
a list of international organizations which can be subject to a tax-exempt policy only upon
approval by the state.149 It drastically decreased the number of international organizations 
enjoying tax-exempt with regard to their grants. The decree failed to establish concrete 
criteria upon which certain international organization can be included in the list. Such a 
discriminatory regulation with regard to grants received from different donors may lead to 
arbitrary application and is subject to a state’s discretion to decide on international 
organizations that would be exempted from taxation in terms of their grants to NGOs. It 
does not directly deprive NGOs from receiving funding from other foreign international 
organizations but it interferes with a right of Russian NGOs to access funding on non-
discriminatory basis and therefore violates their right to freedom of association.
The Russian NGO Law provides for a separate restrictive regulation over utilization of the 
funding received by foreign NGOs operating in the Russian Federation. It establishes a 
requirement for foreign NGOs to submit regular reports on their financial resources and 
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their utilization, as well as their allocation to physical persons or legal entities. The law
enables competent state authorities to ban a transfer of NGOs resources to certain recipients 
for the purposes of protecting the Constitutional system, morality, rights and interest of 
other persons and the national security.150 The state authorities justify such interference by 
the need to ensure transparency and accountability of foreign NGOs on the use of their 
resources, to avoid money laundering and tax evasion and to prevent their interference in 
the state affairs.151 Fundamental Principles on NGOs allow for certain regulation on 
receiving and utilizing funding, however, it must meet the principle of proportionality, in 
other words, there must be a legitimate aim to be pursued in order to justify restrictions on 
a right to funding. Moreover, it provides that foreign and national funding should be 
subject to the same rules, in particular as regards the possible uses of the funds and 
reporting requirements.152 Therefore, having in mind the negative perception of foreign 
NGOs by the Russian state authorities, often considering them as a threat to national 
security and subject to state interference153, such discriminatory regulation provides a state 
with a discretion to selectively apply respective provisions and therefore place excessive 
control over the funding of foreign NGOs. Moreover, a right to ban allocation of funding to 
certain recipients is a clear state interference with internal NGOs affairs, which deprive 
them of exercising their voluntary independent right to freedom of association. 
In case of failure to meet the requirements in a timely manner the foreign NGOs may be 
excluded from the register of foreign NGOs which means that they would be deprived of 
all the rights that are essential to existence and effective operation of NGOs in the Russian 
Federation.154  Exclusion of foreign NGOs from state register is equal to their dissolution as 
it deprives them of the fundamental rights in the Russian Federation. As stated by the 
ECtHR, dissolution as a sanction with regard to exercise of freedom of association should 
be applied only as a last-resort sanction for very serious misconduct of NGOs.155 Having in 
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mind that exclusion from state register is the only sanction provided by the law in terms of 
funding-related violations, regardless of the seriousness of violations, such a provision does 
not meet the principle of proportionality and therefore violates the right to freedom of 
association ensured by Article 11 of the ECHR. 
As funding is a vital mean for NGOs to pursue their objective and activities, restrictive 
regulation on a right to access funding exceeding limits provided by international human 
rights standards deprives NGOs of ability to pursue their objectives and activities 
independently and fails to ensure effective exercise of the right to freedom of association. 
Restrictions on a right to funding are subject to the same requirements provided both by the 
ICCPR and the ECHR in order to justify their legality as international protection of 
freedom of association extends to it on the same terms. Moreover, discriminatory
regulation with regard to funding-related issues of foreign NGOs placing more restrictions 
and burdensome requirements on them and their activities is contrary to the right to 
freedom of association ensured on a non-discriminatory basis. Foreign NGOs are placed in 
less favourable position than national NGOs and discriminated in terms of their right to 
associate, ensured by the ICCPR, the ECHR and by the state constitutions, which all entitle 
everyone with such a right.
3.4 Impact of counter-terrorism measures on freedom of association: the case of the 
Russian Federation
In the wake of 11 September 2001 and the following terrorist acts, it was unanimously 
agreed by international community on the need to take additional measures and to adopt 
stricter laws on counter-terrorism and anti-extremism in order to protect both national and 
international security. Application of such laws often results in human rights restrictions or 
derogation from them as a necessary mean to combat terrorism. Therefore, national 
security as a legitimate aim to restrict human rights has been most challenged lately. In 
some authoritarian countries, however, which are ignorant to criticism and claims of rights, 
particularly the Russian Federation, the limits are often exceeded and such laws are 
justified by them as a legitimate mean to restrict the rights of those claiming for 
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democracy, respect of human rights and fight against impunity156. As human right NGOs 
are actively engaged in such activities, the right to freedom of association is often 
challenged by laws protecting national security. 
In the Russian Federation, the Law on Counteraction of Extremist Activity (hereinafter –
the Russian Extremism Law)157 was adopted as a response to increasing danger to its 
national security and a need to ensure stricter control over terrorist activities in the country. 
Its purpose and objectives serve legitimate aims accepted by the international community, 
however, vague definition of extremist activities established in the law entitles state 
authorities with a broad discretion right to interpret which acts may qualify for extremist 
activities. Article 1 of the Russian Extremism Law provides a list of rather broad range 
activities of public associations or natural persons amounting to extremist activities and 
includes such acts that aim at forcible change of constitutional system of a country, seizure 
or acquisition of peremptory powers, exercise of terrorist activity, excitation of racial, 
national or religious strife, as well as social hatred associated with violence or calls for 
violence. The latter act has been most commonly applied with regard to human rights 
NGOs claiming for justice and publicizing cases of human right violations. A number of 
active human rights NGOs resulted in state accusations of instigating alleged social hatred 
for their critics of state policy. For example, the head of Russian – Chechen Friendship 
Society, engaged in coverage of human rights violations in North Caucasus for a number of 
years, has been convicted of extremist charges for alleged incitement to ethnic hatred by 
publishing anti-war appeals of the president of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the whole 
                                                
156 The analysis will focus on situation in the Russian Federation as freedom of association is challenged by 
the arbitrary application of anti-extremism law on extensive basis there; however, it is more and more 
identified in other countries within the scope of this analysis. 
Overall concern on excessive application of counter-terrorism measures with regard to work of human rights 
defenders is extensively expressed in soft law. See, for example:
- UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/64/163, para. 6.
- CoE Expert Council on NGO Law. para. 266.
- Ibid., Doc. A/61/267, para. 11.
- European Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on counter-terrorism measures and human 
rights, para.30.
157 Federal Law on the Counteraction of Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation.
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organization was dissolved as it did not dissociate from such activities158. Such arbitrary 
application of a rather vague definition of extremist activity may often lead to dissolution 
of the whole organization as the Russian NGO Law provides that persons convicted of 
extremist crimes cannot be founders or members of an NGO159. Moreover, Article 15 of the 
Russian Extremism Law establishes a requirement for NGOs to declare its disagreement 
with such actions and their failure results in qualification of extremism in their activity.        
         
Challenging illegitimacy of restrictions on freedom of association based on the interests of 
countering extremism is rather controversial. Certainly, general requirements, such as 
prescription by law, necessity in a democratic society and legitimate aims, ensured by 
international human rights standards, play a significant role in defining legitimacy of 
restrictions. Question of proportionality is a key question in striking balance between 
national security imperatives and concerns for civil liberties and human rights160. It means 
that adopted measures must justify the aims achieved where such interference should not be 
arbitrary and should not impair the right more than it is necessary under certain 
circumstances. However, current one-sided focus on security concerns both nationally and 
on international level resulted in a situation that is favourable to abuses and arbitrary 
interpretation and application of these restrictions. First of all, the lack of clear universal 
definition of terrorism on international level provides the state with a wide discretion right 
to define its scope and application limits161. Secondly, the ECtHR in numerous cases 
affirmed and granted national authorities a “wide margin of appreciation” with regard to 
the existence and interpretation of the threat of terrorism, which means that it is 
government rather than the court that is granted a prerogative to define what constitutes 
public emergency and therefore to take certain measures to fight it162. Undoubtedly, the 
ECtHR referred to legitimate, proportional and necessary interpretation, however, in such 
countries like the Russian Federation, whose policy is rather detrimental to favorable 
                                                
158 NGO report on new Russian NGO Legislation (2007), p. 13. 
159 Russian NGO Law, Art. 15. 
160 Michaelsen Chistopher (2010).
161 The analysis will not discuss the issue of definition of terrorism on international level as, based on its 
complexity, it is subject to a separate wide-scope analysis.
162 Ibid.54, para.78.
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operation of human rights organizations, such a right is subject to abusive and arbitrary 
application. Therefore, due to absence of clear international standards and lack of the 
ECtHR case law with regard to restrictions of freedom of association applied under the 
guise of combating terrorism, as well as due to vague definition of extremism established in 
the Russian law, it is rather difficult to challenge illegality of actions of the Russian 
authorities taken against human rights organizations. However, the HRC expressed the 
need for more precise definition of extremist activity in the Russian Extremism Law in 
order to avoid its arbitrary application and ensure the rights of individuals and 
associations163. Moreover, following developments in soft law such as the Siracusa 
Principles suggest that the discretion left to governments should be re-considered and 
adjusted164. Certainly, state has a right to take certain measures in order to avoid terror and 
ensure security of state and its people. However, the bottom line of limitation should be 
based on universally accepted standard that a right itself cannot be deprived of its essence. 
National security and human rights cannot be placed in a rather competitive situation as 
“they are each other’s precondition”.165
                                                
163Concluding observations of the UN HRC on the Russian Federation (2003), para. 20. 
164 Ibid. 160.
165 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on the protection of human rights in 
emergency situations (2006), para.8.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
For human rights NGOs to work effectively they need enabling and facilitating legal and 
policy environment. Based on the right to freedom of association guaranteed by 
international human rights standards, they are enabled to exist and exercise their activities. 
Analysis of the legal NGO environment in Azerbaijan, Belarus and the Russian Federation
shows that the efficiency of NGOs is much dependent on the state policy where they 
operate. Acceptance of, and commitment to the fundamental nature of the right of 
individuals to organize freely to work for human rights has yet to be fully realized.
Respective states tend to adopt restrictive NGO laws, as well as to leave a space for their 
arbitrary application in order to suppress organizations whose work is unfavourable to their 
policy and who comment on sensitive areas like injustice, human rights violations or 
impunity of state officials for their committed violations. Lack of a clearly established 
margin of discretion of state authorities enable governments to excessively interfere with 
the right to freedom of association and suppress human rights NGO.
This analysis of state practice in the three respective countries supported the conclusion 
that state authorities aiming to suppress human rights NGOs chose to adopt strict regulation 
on NGO establishment and their registration. Prevailing trend of state authorities to 
suppress the establishment of human rights NGOs in an arbitrary manner has been 
identified. States arbitrary application of legal provisions on registration has most severe 
impact on exercise of the right to freedom of association as it often results in delay of 
registration or its refusal based on minor mistakes or discrepancies of the required 
information and therefore in deprivation of essential rights. In Belarus, continuation of 
activities by individuals in NGOs refused of their registration may result in criminal 
responsibility, which means that individuals are punished for exercising their human 
rights. Such restrictive arbitrary regulation does not meet the requirements set forth by 
international human rights law, particularly the principle of proportionality where balance 
between the intensity of the restrictions and the need must be ensured. 
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Another burden for the NGOs is to meet the requirements related to state control over 
their activities, resulting in heavy restrictions on the right to freedom of association. 
National NGO law provides state authorities with excessive discretion right to monitor and 
pursue supervision over compliance of NGO activities or even ban certain actions without 
any precise criteria on when such powers should be exercised. Under such circumstances 
the right to freedom of association is deprived of its basic essence as NGOs lose their 
fundamental right to operate independently. As a consequence, such interference often 
results in liquidation of respective NGOs as it is the only possible sanction under national 
laws. Due to its indiscriminate application irrespective of the seriousness of violations and 
severe consequences, such regulation is considered contrary to principle of proportionality 
and therefore a breach of international human rights law.
The same obstacles apply for NGOs who seek funding to pursue their activities. In the 
countries studied there is little domestic support for human rights activities, and NGOs may 
require foreign funding to survive. However, these states view it as a threat to its 
legitimacy or its national security, particularly in the case of foreign funding. Therefore,
they adopt legal restrictions on funding from abroad. Regulations result in exercise of the
discretionary right of states to interfere in such affairs and place unclear burdensome 
financial reporting requirements for NGOs, which may result in their dissolution. Severe 
restrictions over funding deprive NGOs of possibility to pursue their activities and 
therefore of effective exercise of their right to freedom of association.
Recent counter-terrorism legislation, allowing for a wide scope of restrictions on human 
rights in order to ensure endangered national security, has become a tool for authoritarian 
countries to set up stricter regulation on establishment and operation of human rights 
NGOs. International law provides for certain degree of state control over the work of 
NGOs in order to ensure their legitimacy and prevent terror. However, due to a still 
evolving concept of terrorism and a rather vague definition both nationally and 
internationally, such regulation is subject to arbitrary application with the aim to eliminate 
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human rights NGOs critical to state policy. It contradicts states obligation to respect the
right to freedom of association. 
This analysis shows that effective protection of the right is rather dependent on national 
implementation of international human rights standards. However, there is still little 
specific regulation on NGOs at an international level and rather sparse ECtHR case law on 
their interpretation that is legally binding states, within whose territories NGOs are 
established. International standards should provide clear and precise requirements and 
limits for state interference with the right to freedom of association of binding effect in 
order to leave states with the minimum possible discretion right. Developments not 
envisaged upon the time when respective human rights treaties were drafted may require 
their progressive interpretation in order to ensure that the spirit and the letter of the treaties 
are upheld.
In turn, national NGO laws must stipulate more specific regulatory measures on exercise of 
freedom of association, which would articulate clear requirements for NGO registration, 
operation and funding. It must set clear limits of permissible restrictions, ensure their
application on a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, respect for the principle of 
proportionality, accompanied by appropriate procedural guarantees that ensure due process 
and judicial review in case of misapplication of the laws.
Restrictive NGO laws and their arbitrary application discourage NGOs from conducting 
their human rights activities and enhancing democracy and social development in the 
countries as it creates a climate of uncertainty and fear. Unfettered state power to refuse 
NGOs registration or to dissolve them for minor discrepancies, as well as interfere in their 
activities and put financial constrains severely impairs existence of an independent civil 
society and weakens the respect for human rights. As a consequence, severe human rights 
violations stay unrevealed and receive less international pressure and alert. This way states 
enjoy freedom to abuse human rights to serve their interests and stay unpunished for their 
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